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Abstract— The impact of SRAM-based FPGAs is constantly 
growing in aerospace industry despite the fact that their volatile 
configuration memory is highly susceptible to radiation effects. 
Therefore, strong fault-handling mechanisms have to be 
developed in order to protect the design and make it capable of 
fighting against both soft and permanent errors. In this paper, a 
fully reconfigurable medium-grained triple modular redundancy 
(TMR) architecture which forms part of a runtime adaptive on-
board processor (OBP) is presented. Fault mitigation is extended 
to the voting mechanism by applying our reconfiguration 
methodology not only to domain replicas but also to the voter 
itself. The proposed approach takes advantage of adaptive 
configuration placement and modular property of the OBP, thus 
allowing on-line creation of different medium-grained TMRs and 
selection of their granularity level. Consequently, we are able to 
narrow down the fault-affected area thus making the error 
recovery process faster and less power consuming. The 
conventional hardware based voting is supported by the ICAP-
based one in order to additionally strengthen the reconfigurable 
intermediate voting. In addition, the implementation 
methodology ensures using only one memory footprint for all 
voters and their voting adaptations thus saving storing resources 
in expensive rad-hard memories. 
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TMR, scalable partial reconfiguration, gcapture, on-board 
processor, fully reconfigurable TMR, TMR with spare, adaptive 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decades many researchers have devoted their 
work to increasing the reliability of digital system design. Due 
to constant improvements in semiconductor industry, reflected 
in reduced voltage, increased operational frequency and 
transistor scaling that faithfully follows "Moore's Law" [1], 
dependability emerged as one of the key concerns when 
designing a digital system. Special attention has been given to 
safety and mission-critical applications in areas such as 
medicine, security, defence, aviation, spaceflight and others 
where a single failure could lead to injures or serious 
consequences considering the mission they are designed for. In 
space applications, where once in orbit no further maintenance 
is possible, it is vital that a system on its own can detect the 
fault, diagnose it, and self-repair in order to recover its normal 
operation. This becomes even more essential when it comes to 
SRAM-based FPGAs whose impact is constantly growing in 
aerospace industry despite the fact that their volatile 
configuration memory is highly susceptible to radiation effects. 
Space engineering starts taking advantage of extensive 
computational resources they possess, short time to market and 
significantly lower non-recurring engineering costs compared 
to their antifuse-based counterparts or predominantly used 
ASICs. The platform also offers high flexibility reflected in the 
fact that it can modify or completely change its functionality 
through reconfiguration. In addition, recent families of FPGAs 
have the possibility to be partially reconfigured during runtime 
[2] which is one of the main assets for their breakthrough in the 
aerospace market. 
In harsh environments the influence of radiation on 
semiconductor devices represents one of the main concerns. 
Many of the already deployed satellites, along with the 
International Space Station, operate in low Earth orbit (LEO) 
where the Single Event Upset (SEU) rate for static RAMs 
exceeds 10"6/bit per day according to the 10 years 
observation study published in [3]. In addition, for SRAM-
based FPGAs, this upset rate is estimated to reach up to several 
upsets per hour depending on the altitude, inclination and solar 
weather conditions. These SEUs are provoked by high energy 
protons or heavy ion components of solar or galactic origins 
which penetrate to the substrate of a transistor causing nuclear 
interactions or ionization. Such phenomena evoke memory cell 
bitflips, which are particularly threatening to the modern 
FPGAs as a single alteration in the configuration memory may 
result in bad interconnections, invalid LUT functions, wrong 
flip-flop values and many other undesirable scenarios. 
Consequently, various methodologies and design techniques 
have to be developed in order to cope with this issue and 
satisfy different reliability requirements. 
The majority of today's digital systems in space use 
redundancy techniques in order to mask potential errors and 
protect its data. As a consequence, one or several parts of a 
circuit are duplicated or triplicated in hardware thus forming 
the well-known Double or Triple Modular Redundancy (DMR 
and TMR) structures [4], [5]. DMR performs the comparison 
of the domain outputs thus being able to detect the presence of 
a fault. However, using a simple comparator, it is impossible to 
determine the affected domain. Therefore, to overcome this 
problem, duplication with comparison is often supported with 
the so-called Concurrent Error Detection (CED) [5]. On the 
other hand, TMR structures use a majority voter at the output 
of the replicas in order to propagate the correct result. As the 
voter is constantly fed with three domain outputs, it can be 
implemented not only to detect the fault and propagate the 
majority-voted output, but also to recognize the faulty domain 
and signal it to the processor or other type of controller. 
Consequently, the system can use that information to trigger 
the reconfiguration of the affected FPGA area and thus remove 
the fault from the design [6]-[8]. TMR is often supported with 
dynamic and partial reconfiguration (DPR) in order to prevent 
the accumulation of transient faults and therefore extend the 
lifetime of the structure. Along with configuration memory 
scrubbing [9], [10], TMR in combination with DPR represents 
one of the most widely used techniques for SEU mitigation in 
SRAM-based FPGAs. 
Although modular redundancy is based upon a simple 
methodology, a lot of research has been done targeting its 
implementation, e.g. the optimal granularity of DMR/TMR 
domains [4], its voting mechanism or even optimal 
reconfiguration time after the detection of the fault [11]. 
Xilinx uses different approaches for implementing TMR 
depending on the logic type [12]. Hence, the logic is 
categorized into four groups: state machine logic, throughput 
logic, I/O logic and special features like PLLs or DSP48s. For 
this purpose, Xilinx developed X-TMRTool which supports 
the automatic generation of triple redundancy. The triplication 
is done at the register level thus achieving the finest 
granularity in contrast to the coarse-grained TMR where the 
entire logic is triplicated and then voted [13]. However, this 
introduces additional area overhead as each register output has 
to be checked. In addition, such fine granularity reduces the 
maximum frequency of the design considering that voters 
have to be introduced on the critical path. 
In general, the size of triplicated modules dictates both 
implementation and robustness of TMR architectures. The 
well-known fact is that the TMR protection of the system ends 
with errors present in more than one domain. That is often a 
consequence of an error accumulation due to insufficiently 
short scrub cycle, multiple bit upset (MBU) or routing errors 
which affect two or more domains. Furthermore, a voter itself 
represents a single point of failure. In other words, a fault in 
the voting part of the circuit may cause wrong system 
behavior and produce incorrect output data. Hence, the voting 
mechanism is also often triplicated thus introducing additional 
area overhead in already expensive architecture. For systems 
with restricted FPGA utilization area and limited power 
consumption additional redundancy costs may be intolerable. 
Therefore, recent research on this topic is focused on finding 
an optimal trade-off between the implementation costs and 
system’s reliability. 
In this paper we present an adaptive reconfigurable voting 
mechanism for both medium- and coarse-grained fault tolerant 
architectures. One of the main goals was to extend the DPR-
supported SEU mitigation to voting partitions, which are 
usually the weakest points of TMR architectures. Our 
reconfigurable voter is capable of adapting to different types 
and positions of fault tolerant structures during runtime. Each 
adaptation is done directly through the internal configuration 
access port (ICAP) by reconfiguring only one frame which 
corresponds to LUTs, thus making possible to use a single and 
reduced memory footprint for all variants of voting. Moreover, 
that particular footprint is used for the configuration of 
intermediate voters in a medium-grained T M R architecture 
where each domain is comprised of several scalable stages. 
Consequently, a fully reconfigurable fault tolerant architecture 
is achieved giving the opportunity to correct the faults in both 
voter and T M R domains. 
Apart from the traditional voting performed in hardware, 
the reconfigurable design is supported by an ICAP-based 
voting. More precisely, captured flip-flop values corresponding 
to the outputs of each stage, and stored in the configuration 
memory, are periodically read through the I C A P and compared 
by the processor. This new feature allows additional securing 
of the conventional hardware-based voting process. Moreover, 
in fault tolerant systems using so-called warm redundancy, 
where it is allowed to lose several clock cycles of data before 
correcting the fault, it can be used as the only voting 
mechanism thus permitting a complete exclusion of voters 
from hardware. 
Our methodology is applied to a digital video broadcast on-
board processor (DVB-OBP) , used in a satellite 
communications application, which is able to self-adapt to 
harsh environmental conditions trading-off performance for 
fault tolerance. This adaptation is performed during runtime by 
duplicating or triplicating the essential part of the design. As a 
result, the voter itself has to be able to adapt to different types 
and positions of configured fault tolerant structures. Moreover, 
we take benefit of the modular property of the design and 
partition the scalable reconfigurable architecture in order to 
create medium-grained T M R . Consequently, we narrow down 
the affected area and using the information obtained by the 
intermediate voters, reconfigure only part of a domain in order 
to repair the fault. Therefore, the proposed method reduces the 
time needed to correct the error thus making the recovery 
process faster and less power consuming. In addition, the 
employed reconfiguration methodology does not use Xilinx 
D P R flow presented in [2], being able to create completely 
isolated T M R domains using relocatable partial configurations. 
Our design methodology can be applied to any system with 
modular properties. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, 
we present the overview of the related work focusing on 
medium-grained T M R architectures and give the motivation 
for our work. Section 3 introduces the base for our current 
research expressed in a runtime reconfigurable O B P capable of 
adapting to different operational demands and environmental 
conditions. The main contribution of this paper is presented in 
section 4. A complete implementation process along with the 
voting mechanism is described and the entire configuration 
comprised of several scalable stages is analyzed. Obtained 
results are summarized and discussed in section 5. Finally, 
section 6 gives perspectives and conclusion of this paper. 
I I . RELATED WORK 
The most common S E U mitigation is configuration 
memory scrubbing which is present in the literature for more 
than 20 years. It implies periodical rewriting of configuration 
memory with a golden copy stored in a rad-hard memory. It is 
performed either independently of the occurrence of an error or 
when there is a mismatch between the readback of the 
configuration memory and the golden copy. Consequently, we 
can distinguish between blind scrubbing and scrubbing with 
readback [6]. However, these techniques introduce large 
overhead in terms of reconfiguration time, increase system’s 
power consumption and often require freezing the device 
during the recovery process. In order to reduce these expenses, 
modern robust designs include redundancy-based techniques 
supported by DPR. 
The main concept of the protection based on modular 
redundancy is presented in Fig. 1. The idea is to implement two 
or more copies of the same circuit which perform the same task 
in parallel. At the output of the circuits a simple comparator is 
implemented in order to detect and mask possible fault 
occurrences. Today’s fault tolerant systems are mostly based 
on TMR performed at the register level following the concept 
used in X-TMRTool [12]. Therefore, the robustness is 
significantly increased as voting is performed over the smallest 
possible modules. However, such fine granularity introduces 
additional area overhead in an architecture that already uses 
200% more logic than necessary. In addition, high number of 
voting instances significantly decreases the maximum 
frequency of a design. 
On the other hand, standard coarse-grained TMR 
architectures [5], [13], [14] use only one voter partition in order 
to propagate the correct result as shown in Fig. 1b. As a voter 
can also be an SEU target, designers triplicate the instance and 
therefore add more redundant components to the system. When 
a fault is detected, the recovery performed through DPR takes 
more time in order to reconfigure large, fault-affected modules. 
Therefore, since the DPR process normally increases power 
consumption, longer reconfiguration causes higher overall 
energy costs. In addition, occurrence of faults in two large 
domains results in erroneous data at the output of the voter and 
completely impairs the structure. 
In order to cope with these issues, current research is 
directed towards an optimal implementation of redundancy-
based fault tolerance. As a result, Wang in [15] performs a 
comprehensive study on the relation between robustness and 
TMR granularity. Various alternatives of partitioning the TMR 
are analyzed and an optimal trade-off between costs and 
reliability is achieved applying medium granularity. A similar 
research is published in [16] where a cascaded TMR is 
implemented by inserting alternative number of triplicated 
voters between the partitions. A quality comparison of a 
coarse- vs. medium-grained TMR robustness is presented in 
[17]. Authors perform partitioning in shared Wishbone 
architectures and categorize injected errors using fault counters 
for each of the domains. They present better fault mitigation 
results when finer, medium-grained TMR is employed. 
Bolchini et al. proposed TMR applications at different 
granularity levels ranging from system to component level [7], 
[18]. They support the fault mitigation using DPR of the fault-
affected domains. By voting smaller TMR domains and 
making them independent one from each other, they achieved 
more than 80% of reduction in terms of average 
reconfiguration time when a fault is detected comparing to the 
typical scrubbing with readback. 
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Fig. 1 a) Double Modular Redundancy - D M R ; b) Triple Modular 
Redundancy – T M R with error localization 
In this work we apply the partitioning methodology to a 
part of an O B P . Taking advantage of our relocatable partial 
configurations, the granularity and positon of the configured 
fault tolerant structures can be modified during runtime and on-
demand. In order to make it possible, we introduce 
reconfigurable voters which are placed between domain 
partitions during runtime. These reconfigurable voters are 
supported by error counters corresponding to each of the 
configured domains. Moreover, the voting process is 
additionally strengthened using the ICAP-based voting [19]. It 
goes directly to the present state of the configuration memory 
and compares the predetermined F F values that correspond to 
the outputs of each partition in every domain. Implementing 
fully reconfigurable redundancy structures able to change from 
coarse to medium granularities during runtime we increase the 
robustness of an entire design and extend their lifetime. In 
addition, using only one memory footprint for each partition of 
the fault tolerant structures we can achieve significant savings 
in terms of resources in expensive rad-hard memories. 
III . RUNTIME ADAPTIVE DEMULTIPLEXER ARCHITECURE 
In this chapter the base for our current research is presented 
summoning up the previously conducted work. It is represented 
in terms of a reconfigurable D E M U X which forms part of an 
O B P capable of adapting to different environmental conditions 
during runtime [19]. Two different reconfiguration strategies 
are applied including conventional and scalable D P R . Block 
diagram of the static part of the design is presented in Fig. 2, 
whereas the reconfigurable parts for both, conventional and 
scalable D P R strategies are shown in Fig. 3a and Fig. 3b, 
respectively. The reconfigurable D E M U X takes the 10-bit 
input signal coming from an analog-to-digital converter and 
performs series of complex operations in each of the 4 
reconfigurable sub-bands (SBs) thus creating carriers of 
different frequencies. These carriers are later used in a 
Demodulator-Decoder ( D E M D E C ) part of the O B P for the 
creation of M P E G - 2 packets following the D V B standard. 
As shown in Fig. 2, the static part of the reconfigurable 
D E M U X is comprised of a Block10, zone selector, an adaptive 
voter and output interface. For simplicity of the block diagram, 
a series of smaller modules which perform various different 
operations are represented as Block10. The outputs of the 
block, S B 1 to SB4, represent a set composed of 8 MHz carriers 
and material for the creation of lower frequency carriers in 
each reconfigurable S B . Therefore, 8MHz carriers are created 
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Fig. 2 Static part of the reconfigurable DEMUX 
in the static part, whereas the rest of the carriers of lower 
frequencies are created in the reconfigurable part of the design. 
In spite of this, the 8 MHz carriers of all 4 SBs are conducted 
to the reconfigurable part. Consequently, the design is able to 
create and output only the demanded carriers at each point of 
operation. 
A special block, in Fig. 2 labeled as Zone Select, is in 
charge of dispatching the Block10 outputs to the corresponding 
reconfiguration zone using the information stored in a 
processor accessible Placement register. Hence, a complete 
flexibility in SB placement is achieved. Taking advantage of it, 
the design is capable of creating different fault tolerant 
structures in the reconfigurable portion of the chip during 
runtime. This is achieved by sending the data, corresponding to 
only one SB, to several reconfiguration zones and by 
reconfiguring these areas with the same bitstream. 
Consequently, the configured hardware will create carriers of 
the same frequency and return them back to the static part of 
the design. Depending on the number of zones that receive the 
same inputs, the design can configure dual or triple 
redundancy. In addition, since there are 4 reconfiguration 
zones, a SB can be triplicated in 4 different positions in the 
chip. As a result, the system is able to remove a configuration 
from a zone struck by a hard error and configure it in a spare 
one thus making it capable of fighting not only soft errors, but 
also permanent ones by simply changing the position of a 
configured TMR structure. This configuration is present in the 
literature as TMR-with-spare [20]. 
The carriers coming from the reconfigurable zones are 
taken by a voter which, depending on the present value of the 
placement register, adapts to different types and positions of 
configured redundancies. It takes the outputs coming from all 
four zones, compares (DMR), votes (TMR) and finally 
forwards them to the output interface. Any detected error in the 
voting process is stored in the flag register setting one of the 4 
bits corresponding to the area that has been affected. A bit set 
in the flag register triggers the reconfiguration of the affected 
domain. Therefore, the system is able to self-recover from an 
SEU appeared as a bitflip in the configuration memory. 
Two DPR strategies applied to the architecture are 
presented in Fig. 3. The first one is the conventional 
reconfiguration where one module is substituted by another at 
each change of demand. An example configuration, where 0.5, 
1, 2 and 4 MHz are demanded from the SBs, is presented in 
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Fig. 3 Reconfigurable part of the D E M U X architecture: a) Conventional 
D P R strategy; b) Scalable D P R strategy 
Fig. 3a. In order to reconfigure less area and such obtain a 
faster and less power consuming D P R process, we take 
advantage of the modular property of the S B logic, partition the 
S B and create runtime scalable partial configurations. The 
same configuration example for scalable D P R is presented in 
Fig. 3b. It can be noted that when using the first approach, 4 
reconfiguration zones are available, corresponding to 4 SBs. 
On the other hand, when using scalable configurations, each of 
the SBs is additionally partitioned thus creating 3 sub-zones. 
Due to the lack of resources in the current chip, the 4th block 
cannot be configured. Therefore, when 0.5 MHz carriers are 
demanded from a S B in the second approach, a partially 
scalable configuration containing blocks 2, 3 and 4 together is 
connected to the Block1. Using scalable configurations, the 
obtained savings reach up to 43% in terms of storage resources 
in an expensive rad-hard memory. Moreover, we made an 
important step towards the possibility to further increase the 
fault tolerance of the design. 
I V . FULLY RECONFIGURABLE FAULT-TOLERANCE 
A vast majority of today’s fault tolerant structures 
employed in SRAM-based FPGAs use the redundancy 
approach. However, not as many support it with D P R to 
mitigate the occurring faults and stop their accumulation. 
Those designs that do use D P R often focus only on redundancy 
domains thus completely neglecting the importance of the 
voter. More precisely, when an S E U appears and gets detected 
in one of the replicated modules, the system triggers the 
reconfiguration process and reconfigures the logic that 
corresponds to the affected domain. However, when a fault 
appears in a voting partition it completely destroys the 
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Fig. 4 Adaptive voting partition for a fully reconfigurable fault tolerance 
structure. A solution which is often found in the literature 
implies triplication of the voter as well. That might be too 
much for a system with strict area and power constraints or 
design in which triplicated modules possess huge number of 
signals that have to be voted. Moreover, even if triplicated, a 
voter losing one of its replicas stops being properly secured 
since any subsequent error in the two remaining replicas would 
corrupt the entire composition. Therefore, our approach takes a 
step further and introduces adaptive reconfigurable voting 
which brings the opportunity to correct not only faults present 
in domain replicas but also those which appear in the voting 
partition. 
A. Runtime Adaptive Reconfigurable Voting Partition 
In order to enable reconfigurable voting for our fault 
tolerant structures a voting partition comprised of two voter 
units is implemented and shown in Fig. 4. One voter takes the 
SB material coming from the static part of the design, whereas 
the other one compares the created carriers coming from 
reconfigurable modules. They are able to adapt to both non-
redundancy and redundancy modes of operation. In the former 
case, voters perform a simple propagation of the inputs. When 
a SB is duplicated it adapts to the DMR position, compares the 
inputs coming from the duplicated logic and, if equal 
propagates them along with the 2 remaining inputs. On the 
other hand when a SB is triplicated, voters adapt to the TMR 
position and act as majority voters. The remaining input is 
simply propagated to the output. It is important to note that in 
this composition, the voter, as well as the entire structure, is 
constantly in a TMR-with-spare mode. Therefore, if a 
permanent error appears in one of the reconfiguration zones, 
the system can stop using the affected part of the hardware and 
move the logic to the spare zone. Consequently, the system is 
able to mitigate not only soft errors in the configuration 
memory but also permanent errors which cannot be repaired 
via DPR. The price that has to be paid in that case is the 
inability to configure another SB along with the triplicated one. 
The adaptation is performed through ICAP by modifying 
only 4 bits that control the outputs of 4 implemented LUTs. 
These LUTs are in charge of controlling the voters’ 
configuration so that the voting can adapt to different types and 
positions of the configured structures. They are placed in a 
single slice and configured such that the bits corresponding to 
their outputs reside in only one CLB frame. Therefore, a faster 
adaptation is achieved since only one frame needs to be 
reconfigured. Apart from the control LUTs, two 4-bit flag 
registers have been implemented to indicate the presence of the 
fault in one of the reconfigurable domains. If a mismatch 
occurs in the voting process a bit corresponding to the affected 
zone is set high. In addition, eight counters, four per voter, are 
implemented in order to count possible faults in 4 different 
branches. 
B. Implementation methodology 
When the Xilinx DPR flow is not used, the implementation 
of reconfigurable partitions requires slightly different 
approach. In order to design completely independent and 
therefore relocatable modules, each partial configuration is 
treated as a separated module. Once the logic is synthesized, it 
is floorplanned in PlanAhead such that occupies the least 
possible area on chip. After the implementation step, a Netlist 
Circuit Description (NCD) file, which is a Xilinx proprietary 
binary format to internally describe the implemented design, is 
created. In order to contain the routing within strict boundaries 
on chip, a user can open the file using FPGA Editor and try to 
reroute the conflicting nets. Although helpful when compact 
configuration is not a must, the lack of routing flexibility 
implies searching for other solutions in applications with 
limited FPGA resources. 
The first step in our design methodology implies converting 
the NCD file to Xilinx Description Language (XDL) [21] using 
the -ncd2xdl command in Command Prompt of the ISE Design 
Suite. Therefore, a human-readable equivalent version of the 
NCD is created which allows design modifications exploiting 
an open source java based set of RapidSmith [22], [23]. We 
modified the RapidSmith based router published in [24] and 
such created our own rerouter which contains all nets of the 
design within the predetermined area on chip. When the XDL 
file is repaired by the rerouter, it is reconverted to NCD using 
the - xdl2ncd command. Consequently, a programming file is 
generated containing a full configuration of the FPGA. Since 
only part of it is useful information, we cut the part of the 
programming file corresponding to the portion of FPGA area 
where the logic is implemented and store it as a partial 
configuration file in our external RAM memory. Finally, we 
obtain the smallest possible memory footprint and on-chip 
relocatable partial configuration. 
Each partial configuration in our design is implemented 
following the above set of steps. Therefore, compact, reliable 
and, most importantly, relocatable partial configurations are 
obtained. Consequently, they can be used in any other part of 
the chip with the same architecture. This implementation 
methodology is also applied to the voting partition thus 
enabling flexible voter insertion for medium-grained fault 
tolerant structures. 
C. Scalable Medium-Grained Fault Tolerant Structures 
The implementation of the runtime adaptive voting 
partition allows the employment of fully reconfigurable TMR 
structures. Such configuration is presented in Fig. 5 where the 
3rd SB is configured along with the triplicated 2nd SB. In this 
example configuration, 1 MHz carriers are demanded from the 
TMR-protected 2nd SB, whereas 8 MHz carriers are demanded 
from the 3rd one. When using conventional partial 
configurations for the creation of fault tolerant structures, only 
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Fig. 5 An example of a coarse-grained TMR configuration – Demanded 1 
MHz carriers from the 2nd SB and 8 MHz carriers from the 3rd SB 
one reconfigurable voter is used to vote and propagate the error 
free carriers to the static part of the design. It is able to mask 
errors present in one of the TMR domains. Moreover, a 
possible SEU affecting the voting partition can be eliminated 
simply by reconfiguring its on-chip reconfiguration zone. 
However, the drawback of such configuration is still the same 
as in all coarse-grained fault tolerant structures. It becomes 
evident when errors accumulate or a MBU appears affecting 
two TMR replicas. We prevent the accumulation by instantly 
reconfiguring the domain in error, i.e. when a bit of the flag 
register signals a mismatch in a voting process. However, due 
to large size of the replicas, the probability of MBU corrupting 
two domains is high. Therefore, we take benefit of our scalable 
partial configurations and place in between our adaptive voter 
partition thus making possible the on-demand configuration of 
medium-grained DMR/TMR structures. 
Using smaller modules for triplication and voting their 
outputs within the intersections increases the overall robustness 
of the design. More precisely, the probability of two errors 
affecting two different domains decreases as the same, smaller 
block has to be struck by an error in both of the replicas. An 
example of a medium-grained TMR configuration is presented 
in Fig. 6. The 3rd SB which creates 2 MHz carriers is triplicated 
and configured along with the 1st SB which creates 4 MHz 
carriers. As can be seen, two voting partitions are placed 
between the static part and Block1 and between Block1 and 
Block2. These blocks are in charge of creating 4 and 2 MHz 
carriers, respectively, along with the material for lower 
frequency carriers creation used in the subsequent blocks. The 
4 MHz carriers are discarded in the 3rd SB, whereas in the 1st 
SB they are propagated through the 2nd voting partition and 
returned back to the static part using a simple cover. 
The advantage of using medium-grained redundancy over 
coarse-grained one can be explained using this example 
configuration. If two faults occur in two replicas of the 3rd SB, 
where one of them affects Block1 and the other Block2, the 
structure will still be able to propagate correct data back to the 
output interface. Moreover, an instant repair of the blocks 
through reconfiguration will be triggered thus extending the 
lifetime of the structure. On the other hand, if the traditional 
partial configurations are used for the presented composition, 
the occurrence of faults in two PBS 2 configurations would 
corrupt the entire structure. In addition, when only one domain 
is affected, the recovery process takes longer since larger 
domain needs to be reconfigured. 
2 MHz 
SB3i 
2 MHz 
SB1i 
4 MHz 
SB3 
2 MHz 
•[ Block | ^ 
•1 1 j¿3 
Block fr> 
* • [ Block l # 
Block 
1 
Í 
« 
J0 
n 
Fig. 6 An example of a scalable medium-grained TMR configuration – 
Demanded 2 MHz carriers from the 3rd SB and 4 MHz carriers from the 
1st SB 
The presented medium-grained redundancy can tolerate 
error accumulation and MBUs to a higher extend. Moreover, 
the design is capable of changing the granularity level on 
demand. Therefore, it is allowed to make the decision online 
on whether to triplicate smaller or larger modules. 
Furthermore, when using the scalable modules, DMR and 
TMR structures can grow and decrease during runtime at each 
change of demand from a triplicated SB. This is achieved by 
reconfiguring smaller reconfiguration zones (Fig. 6) which 
implies faster and less power consuming adaptation. 
In both coarse- and medium-grained redundancies, a soft 
error affecting the voting partition can be mitigated by 
reconfiguring the affected area. In order to further protect the 
voting process we support it with the ICAP-based voting which 
enters the configuration memory and compares the actual FF 
values corresponding to the domain outputs. 
D. The ICAP-based voting: A support for the conventional 
hardware-based voting 
In order to additionally strengthen the voting process, we 
go directly to the present state of the configuration memory 
and compare the predetermined FF values that correspond to 
the outputs of each partition used in TMR/DMR compositions. 
To do so, during the floorplanning step in our implementation 
methodology, using LOC and BEL constraints we fix the 
registers corresponding to the outputs of the module to 
particular slices and FFs within those slices. In this way the bits 
corresponding to their initial values (INIT0/INIT1) in the 
configuration memory reside within only one CLB frame in 
order to accelerate the voting process. This is done for all 
partial configurations, including the voter partition where, 
instead of the outputs, flag registers and error counters are 
constrained. Consequently, using the logic allocation file (*.ll), 
which can be created together with the programing file (*.bit), 
we can locate the constrained FF bits within a frame. 
When a particular module is triplicated, the location of the 
bits in the configuration memory that correspond to the outputs 
of DMR/TMR domains is known. Although the domains 
belong to different clock regions, they reside within the same 
frame and have the same position within that frame. Taking 
advantage of it, the GCAPTURE command is periodically 
issued to the ICAP using our modified enhanced HWICAP 
([19], [25]) thus capturing the present state of the configuration 
memory. Hence, the actual complement value of the outputs is 
Block 2 
Block 2 
1 
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Block 2 
written to their INIT0/INIT1 bits in the configuration memory. 
Consequently, a readback of the C L B column is performed 
where the output FFs are placed. We repeat the process for 
each of the three T M R replicas and extract the bits of interest 
from the read configuration. By placing them in only one, 31st 
frame of the 36 frame long readback, a significantly faster 
extraction process is achieved. Hence, the floorplanning has to 
be performed carefully. The extracted bits are then compared 
by a processor and if there is a mismatch, two different 
scenarios are possible. 
The first scenario takes into account the priority of the 
conventional hardware-based voter, i.e. verifies whether the 
mismatch is recognized by the voter checking the INIT0/INIT1 
bits corresponding to the flag and error counter registers. 
Therefore, an error present in the voting partition can be 
detected. In the second one, the ICAP-based voting takes 
precedence and by changing the L U T function through 
reconfiguration directs the carriers from the non-corrupted 
domain to the output. The second scenario can be used either to 
detect the error that occurred in the voting partition or to 
completely exclude the voter from hardware in applications 
where it is allowed to lose several clock cycles of data before 
masking or correcting the fault. In the latter case, multiple 
input signature registers (MISRs) could be implemented to 
record the data coming from each of the domains between two 
consecutive captures. 
V . RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
In order to evaluate the proposed architecture, the entire 
system is implemented on a Xilinx Virtex-5 XC5VFX130T 
F P G A . The implementation of the static part of the design, 
along with all partial configurations, is done in I S E Design 
Suite 14.2 following the methodology presented in this paper. 
These implemented partitions are presented in Fig. 7. The 
results in terms of device utilization and size in memory for the 
voting partition and partial modules used for triplication are 
given in TABLE I . We can scale our runtime adaptable D M R and 
T M R structures in area such that create carriers in the range 
from 8 MHz to 2 MHz. The increased reliability of the system 
is achieved at an increased cost in terms of the on-chip area 
overhead. In the use case, we lost the opportunity to go up to 1 
MHz due to the limitations in terms of the F P G A resources. 
Nevertheless, the same principle can be used in every design 
with modular properties where reliability is the main concern. 
A real case implementation of the example composition 
shown in Fig. 6 is presented in Fig. 7. Each module occupies 
the height of 2 clock regions. As presented, the voting 
partition, put in between the blocks, has the height of 8 clock 
regions corresponding to the height of 4 SBs. Its logic is 
implemented within one C L B column. The fault injection is 
performed in the right part of the chip where the structures are 
configured during runtime. In order to accelerate the process 
the faults are injected in frames related to the used LUTs to 
ensure that it will affect the operation of the design. As 
expected, when traditional partial configurations are used to 
configure the T M R structures, the injection of two errors in 
different reconfiguration zones provided erroneous data at the 
output. When injecting the faults in the same positions in the 
medium-grained T M R architectures, those faults that affected 
TABLE I . 
THE DEVICE UTILIZATION AND SIZE OF THE MEMORY FOOTPRINTS 
OF THE PARTIAL CONFIGURATIONS USED IN FULLY RECONFIGURABLE 
FAULT TOLERANT STRUCTURES 
* 
Occ. 
Slices 
Size 
[KB] 
Voting 
Partition 
253 
(1%) 
177 
PBS 
1 
280 
(1%) 
132 
PBS 
2 
661 
(3%) 
211 
Block 
1 
333 
(1%) 
88 
Block 
2 
424 
(2%) 
120 
Cover 
8 
(1%) 
12 
TABLE I I . 
THE RECONFIGURATION TIME FOR EACH OF THE PARTIAL 
CONFIGURATIONS USED IN FULLY RECONFIGURABLE FAULT 
TOLERANT STRUCTURES 
* 
Recovery 
time [ ] 
Voting 
Partition 
119 
PBS 
1 
103 
PBS 
2 
192 
Block 
1 
60 
Block 
2 
90 
Fig. 7 The implemented partial configurations, the static part of the 
design and a real case of the example composition presented in Fig. 6 
two domains, where Block1 is affected in one and Block2 in 
the other, were masked by our reconfigurable voting 
intersections. As a result, fault-free data was detected at the 
output. The recovery is determined by the time it takes to 
reconfigure the affected domain. The time necessary for the 
reconfiguration of each of the modules is presented in TABLE II. 
When faults are injected in the composition presented in Fig. 7, 
the recovery times are 60 and 80 depending on the block 
that is affected. On the other hand, when the faults are injected 
in the same locations in its large-grained counterpart, which 
uses the conventional partial configuration PBS2, the recovery 
time exceeds 192 . Therefore, by narrowing down the fault 
affected area in the use case, we achieved the reduction in 
recovery time that ranges from 58% to 69%. Moreover, the 
size in rad-hard memory of the partial modules given in TABLE I 
also favors medium-grained structures as fewer resources have 
to be reserved for storing their domain configuration. In the 
case when the injected fault affects the voting partition, the 
ICAP-based voting is in charge of detecting the fault and 
triggering the reconfiguration process. The recovery is 
determined by several tasks: GCAPTURE command to the 
ICAP; readback of a CLB column; check the INIT0/INIT1 bits 
that correspond to the flag registers; and reconfiguration of the 
partition. Therefore, the design is able to detect and 
consequently mitigate errors present in the voting partition at 
the cost of losing several clock cycles of the operation. 
In warm redundancy applications, the voter could be 
completely excluded from hardware leaving the voting 
partition only with a set of MISRs to record the output changes 
between two periodical issues of the ICAP-based voting. 
However, the optimal capture frequency should be calculated 
considering the environmental conditions, requirements and 
sensitivity of the design. 
V I . CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have presented a reconfigurable voting 
mechanism able to adapt to different modes of operation and 
different types of configured fault tolerant structures during 
runtime. Taking advantage of the implementation metho-
dology, one memory footprint can be used for the insertion of 
voting partitions between the scalable modules thus creating 
fully reconfigurable medium-grained redundancy structures. 
The design can take advantage of both coarse- and medium-
grained redundancies using conventional and scalable partial 
configurations. Results show that when the voting is performed 
over smaller, scalable modules the robustness of the entire 
design is increased. Moreover, significant savings in terms of 
recovery time are obtained using the medium-grained 
composition. The performed fault injection provided expected 
results, also favoring the finer granularity. Nevertheless, certain 
performance capabilities are lost due to the partitioning thus 
directly pointing to the price that has to be paid when 
increasing the reliability by decreasing the granularity level. 
The methodology performed in our runtime adaptable D V B -
O B P can be applied to any other design with modular 
properties. 
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